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EQUAL PROTECTION'S ANTINOMIES AND THE
PROMISE OF A CO-CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH
Julie A. Nicet

At the present as well as at any other time, the center of gravity of legal
development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in judicial
decision, but in society itself.'
INTRODUCTON

An emerging phenomenon in the study of discrimination and inequality is the application of co-constitutive theory to equal protection
jurisprudence. As developed by law and society scholars, co-constitutive theory explores both how law shapes society and how society
shapes law. 2 Law and society researchers, for example, have "examined the ways in which the boundaries of race, religion, social class,
gender, ethnicity, and nationality help constitute and give meaning to
legal phenomena, as well as the ways in which the law's intended and
unintended consequences help constitute these social categories." 3
To understand these co-constitutive relations between social identity
and anti-discrimination law, many law and society scholars have favored research that "decenters" law; that is, they focus attention on
t Associate Professor, University of Denver College of Law. For helpful comments I
thank the organizers and participants in Cornell Law Review's Symposium on Discrimination and Inequality: Emerging Issues, the participants in the University of Michigan Law
School's Law and Equality Workshop, the faculty of the University of Utah College of Law,
as well as Don Herzog, Jeremy Paul, Jane Schacter, Susan Sterett, Joyce Sterling, Jessica
West, and especially Martha Ertman.
1

EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW at xv (Walter

L. Moll trans., 1936).
2

See ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAw AND SOCIETY.TOWARD A CoNsrrTrlvE THE-

ORY OF LAw 3 (1993) (describing constitutive theory as focusing "on the way in which law is

implicated in social practices, as an always potentially present dimension of social relations,
while at the same time reminding us that law is itself the product of the play and struggle
of social relations"). Because law and society scholars sometimes use the phrase "constitutive theory" to refer to the unidirectional impact of law on society, I use the phrase "coconstitutive theory" to emphasize the mutually constitutive relations of law and society. See,
e.g., Frank Munger, Sociology of Law for a PostliberalSociety, 27 Loy. L.A L. Rzv. 89, 101-05
(1993) (describing the initial turn to constitutive theory and the more recent emphasis on
the mutual interaction between legal and nonlegal spheres).
3 Austin Sarat et al., The Concept of Boundaries in the Practicesand Products of Sociolegal
Scholarship:An Introduction, in CROSSING BouNDARiEs: TRADIToNs AND TRANsFORMATONS IN
LAW AND Socimyn RESEARCH 4 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998) (collecting and summarizing
sources).
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understanding societal practices rather than jurisprudence. 4 Departing somewhat from this decentered norm, this Article recenters law by
exploring how co-constitutive theory informs equal protection theory
and doctrine.
This Article explores three major points. Part I suggests that
equal protection theory and doctrine are embedded in an antinomic
discourse-a perpetual debate revolving around choices between two
purportedly plausible but conflicting principles. This examination of
equal protection jurisprudence reveals ten antinomies and shows that
current law favors the conservative preference within each antinomy.
Part II posits that co-constitutive theory offers a framework for understanding how both the antinomic debates and their attendant choices
become internalized and naturalized throughout law and society. I
then suggest that co-constitutive theory implies not only that making
choices between the antinomic alternatives is unnecessary, but also
that making such choices impairs a more comprehensive understanding of the co-constitutive shaping of sociological meanings. Thus, a
co-constitutive approach transcends equal protection's antinomic discourse. Finally, Part III ilustrates that co-constitutive theory is already
at work in both doctrine and scholarship. I review how three prominent Supreme Court cases illustrate co-constitutive theory in practice,
arguing that the reasoning underlying these decisions reveals a coconstitutive understanding of law and society. I submit that the
Court's reasoning implies an emerging third (co-constitutive) strand
to accompany the first (suspect class) and the second (fundamental
right) strands of equal protection doctrine.5 Moreover, I suggest that
other contributions to this Symposium reflect co-constitutive insights.
Taken together, these three points show that co-constitutive theory
offers a useful and largely unmined fi-amework for further theoretical
and doctrinal development regarding sociolegal inequality.
4
See, e.g., Munger, supranote 2, at 120-21 (linking the turn toward decentering law
to the popularity of Michel Foucault's insight that power emanates from everywhere). For
examples of decentered research, see KRIsrrrN BumiLLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SocrTr. THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMs 52-70 (1988) (using interviews with people who have
experienced discrimination to illuminate how antidiscrimination law is constrained by and
reinforces the social system that constructs victims as powerless); PATRICIA EwICK & SUSAN
S. SmBY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LAn passim (1998) (exploring the meaning of law by analyzing open-ended interviews with adults who were asked to
talk about their home, work, and community problems). For a recent example of lawcentered research grounded in social context, see SALLY ENGLE MERRY, COLONIZING
HAwAI'I: THE CULTURAL POWER OF LAw (2000) (using archival court records to explore the
role of law in transforming one Hawaiian community).
5 See infraPart IIA (reviewing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982), and M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996)). For further discussion of this
third strand of equal protection doctrine, see Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in
Equal ProtectionJurisprudence:Recognizing the Co-ConstitutiveNature of Rights and Classes, 1999
U. ILL. L. REv. 1209 passim.

1394

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1392

I
EQUAL PROTEM ON's ANTINOMIC DISCOURSE
In order to consider what co-constitutive theory has to offer equal
protection theory and doctrine, we must first review the contemporary
state of equal protection jurisprudence. Taking a bird's eye view, several patterns immediately become apparent. First, equal protection
jurisprudence has evolved into a discourse revolving around ten principle antinomies. These binary discourses are not dichotomies but
are better understood as antinomies, because they typically present
choices between two plausible albeit conflicting principles. These antinomies have defined the terms of a seemingly perpetual debate between conservative and progressive theorists, and sometimes those
within each camp. They inform definitions of the ends of equal protection, the means for achieving those ends, and the identities on
which equal protection turns. One should keep in mind that the antinomies overlap considerably with one another, and the differences
between them are often subtle. Nonetheless, each antinomy occurs,
at least occasionally, as an independent strand of discourse.
The first antinomy is foundational and concerns whether the ultimate end of equal protection should be to eliminate subordination or
to promote assimilation. Reaching consensus regarding the goal of
equal protection would set the standard for evaluating the effectiveness of the means aimed at achieving that end. However, no guiding
consensus has emerged. Seven other antinomies pose choices regarding various means for achieving equal protection. These means-based
antinomies engage theorists in a perpetual debate regarding the appropriate way to implement equal protection, including choices between the following: sameness or difference, backward-looking or
forward-looking, blindness or consciousness, classification or class, intent or effects, public or private, and process or substance. Two final
dilemmas revolve around the identities on which equal protection
doctrine turns. These antinomies are whether identity is singular or
multiple and whether identity is fixed or fluid. A brief description
and a few examples of each antinomy follow.
A.

The Ten Antinomies
1. Assimilation or Antisubordination

The fundamental question underlying the equal protection mandate is what end it requires. Conservative scholars have insisted that
equal protection requires that government treat every individual the
same. 6 This approach leads to ignoring the distinguishing trait-tak6 See, e.g., THOMAS SowELL, CIVIL RIGHTS: RHETORIC OR REALrTY? 37-38 (1984) (arguing in favor of a conception of civil rights in which "all individuals should be treated the
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ing a so-called color-blind or gender-neutral position-and endorses a
standard of sameness for all classes within a classification (e.g., treating African Americans the same as whites, or treating women the same
as men). Presumably, this approach would prohibit the government
7
from considering or promoting differences among individuals.
Rejecting this formalist, conservative approach, progressive scholars have argued that equal protection's primary end should be to disrupt the use of law as an instrument for perpetuating hierarchical
power relations. Some scholars label this as the antisubordination 8 or
anticaste principle. 9 Scholars advancing this approach charge that
formal equal protection doctrine serves as an instrument of social
power to mark some people as superior and others as inferior, thus
creating and perpetuating rather than disrupting hierarchical power
relations. 10
These scholars have assailed the assimilationist approach as de
facto protection of the very discrimination it formally denounces."
Formal equality, they argue, furthers subordination by hiding its key
elements: it requires a standard for comparison, and the presumed
standard has been the experiences of those marked dominant. 12 In
same under the law, regardless of race, religion, sex or other such social categories" and
decrying the civil rights movement's shift toward affirmative action, which "requires that
[people] be judged with regard to such group membership"); Charles Fried, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Two Concepts ofEquality, 104 HARv. L. REv. 107, 107-13 (1990) (criticizing the Supreme Court's application of intermediate scrutiny to affirmative action
programs in the principal case); Lino A. Graglia, Race-Conscious Remedies, 9 HARv. J.L. &
PuB. PoL'v 83, 83 (1986) (arguing that affirmative action is discriminatory and not
remedial).
7 One irony of the formal-equality approach is that it treats individuals as if they all
are the same while one argument against implementation of the equal protection mandate
is that it will enforce an undesirable sameness.
8 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-SubordinationAbove Alk Sex, Race, and Equal Protection,61
N.Y.U. L. Ray. 1003, 1007-09 (1986) (arguing "that courts should analyze equal protection
from an anti-subordination perspective"); Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the
States: Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 283, 298 n.74, 312
(1994) (discussing other scholars who advocate the goal of antisubordination).
9 Justice Harlan, in his famous dissent, stated that "[t]here is no caste here." Plessyv.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1957). Contemporary scholars, such as Catharine MacKinnon, have
argued forcefully that gender matters in society precisely because of its "consequences for
social power." CATHArN A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND
Lw 40 (1987).

10 See, eg., Colker, supra note 8, at 1012 ("The anti-differentiation principle, in contrast, does a disservice to this history and fundamental aspiration by asserting that discrimination against whites is as problematic as discrimination against blacks.").
11 See Kimberl Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARv. L. Ray. 1331, 1346 (1988) ("[T]o the extent that antidiscrimination law is believed to embrace color-blindness, equal opportunity
rhetoric constitutes a formidable obstacle to efforts to alleviate conditions of white
supremacy.").
12 Even before we consider how the assimilationist approach plays out within a social
context, we find that it suffers from logical flaws. For example, it is unreasonable to hold
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other words, if all individuals are to be treated the same, the question
arises: the same as what? The judicial default rule has been to treat
individuals deemed superior as the standard, thus comparing
subordinated people to dominant people and granting subordinated
people only those rights that dominant people need or value.
This first antinomy between the goals of antisubordination and
assimilation recurs throughout the antinomies that follow. One might
understand the remaining antinomies as presenting debates over the
appropriate means to equal protection's end. Yet the quarrels over
means ultimately relate to the first antinomy's conflict over the end
itself. This means-end relation is illustrated nicely by the following
examination of the second antinomy, which uses constructs of sameness and difference to explore the conflict.
2.

Sameness or Difference

The second antinorny concerns whether law should treat
subordinated people the same as or different than dominant people.
This debate has raged particularly within feminist theory, with scholars questioning whether women should be treated the same as or different than men. In an early article, Wendy Williams argued that law
should treat women the same as men because treating women differently reinforces inequalities unfavorable to women.' 3 Mary Ann Case
continues this tradition, defending the wisdom of a sameness approach. 14 Other commentators have criticized the sameness approach. For example, Christine Littleton has criticized equality
analysis for failing to recognize that, even if gender itself does not
make a difference, the social construction of gender makes an enormous difference, and the impact of this difference must be eradicated. 15 Martha Fineman also has argued that equal protection rules
must account for "the different structural positions of women and
subordinated individuals to a standard of the dominant group because subordinated persons are differently, rather than similarly, situated to dominant persons with regard to their
power in society. Moreover, not everyone can enjoy dominance. By definition, the higher

status of the dominant depends on the existence of the lower status of the subordinated,
creating a hierarchy of status.
13 See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis:
Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and
Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTs. L. RF.P. 175, 196 (1982); see also Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and
the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 956 (1984) (rejecting a difference approach because "[n]o constitutional principle... allows courts to effectuate the range of changes
needed to allow equality between men and women" and further noting that "constitutional
concepts of equality are important both because of their concrete impact on legislative
power and individual right and because constitutional ideas reflect and shape culture").
14 See Mary Ann Case, "The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns': ConstitutionalSex Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CoRNELL L. REv. 1447, 1471-72 (2000).
15 See Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1332
(1987) ("[it is not gender difference, but the difference gender makes, that creates a
divide.").
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men in our society" in order to achieve "result-equality."' 6 In a different vein, KimberlM Crenshaw has criticized the sameness approach for
its essentialism, contending that it fails to account for differences
among women by focusing on singularly disadvantaged groups such as
white women or African-American men.' 7 In so doing, the sameness
approach fails to address the problems of those whose multiple identities make them more disadvantaged, such as African-American
women. 18
While the sameness/difference debate focuses on the means for
providing equal protection, it relates back to the first antinomy's debate over the ultimate end. Catharine MacKinnon emphasizes this
connection in her rejection of the sameness/difference model on the
grounds that it perpetuates the subordination of women by using a
masculine standard in evaluating both sameness and difference. 19
She argues that this model evaluates those who most need action to
achieve equal treatment, namely those who are most dissimilar to
men, according to a standard set by men. 20 As a replacement, she
proposes a dominance approach that focuses on dismantling hierar21
chical distribution of power.

MARTHA Az BERTsoN FnqEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUAIrrv Ti RHrORi AND REALOF DrVORCE REFoRM 3 (1991). Professor Fineman explains that "[r]ules that focus on
result-equality ... are attempts to ensure that the effects of rules as they will be applied will
place individuals in more or less equal positions." Id. Further, she framed the difference
approach as an instrumental understanding of equality that requires treating men and
women differently so that "they end up on the same level." Id.
17 See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine,Feminist T eory, and Antiracist Politics,1989 U. CH.
LEGAL F. 139, 139 (criticizing the single-axis analysis that tends to "treat race and gender as
mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis"); Crenshaw, supra note 11, at
1349 ("The struggle, it seems, is to maintain a contextualized, specific world view that
reflects the experience of Blacks."). For a discussion of the antinomy between singular and
multiple identities, see infra Part .-9.
18 See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 139-40.
19 See MACKONNoN, supra note 9, at 37.
20 See id. at 37. MacKinnon writes:
Why should you have to be the same as a man to get what a man gets simply
because he is one? Why does maleness provide original entitlement, not
questioned on the basis of its gender, so that it is women-women who
want to make a case of unequal treatment in a world men have made in
their image. . .- who have to show in effect that they are men in every
relevant respect, unfortunately mistaken for women on the basis of an accident at birth.
Id.
21 See id. at 40-45. Mary Becker replies that MacKinnon's focus on power itself perpetuates patriarchy and that "[iut is relational feminism, with its valuation of caretaking,
relationships, and empathy, that has the potential to improve well-being for women, children, and men." Mary Becker, Patriarchy and Inequality: Towards a Substantive Feminism,
1999 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 21, 39, 85.
16

fly
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3. Backward-Looking or Forward-Looking
The third antinomy concerns whether the removal of prejudicial
classifications from the face of laws satisfies the mandate of equal protection or whether government has the obligation, or at least the authority, to take affirmative actions designed to counteract ongoing
subordination effectuated by these laws. The Supreme Court has
thwarted affirmative action by subjecting governmental antisubordination efforts to strict scrutiny, a standard that is extremely difficult to
meet.2 2 Many commentators have condemned the narrowness of a
backward-looking approach. In The Alchemy of Race and Rights, for example, Patricia Williams reflects on the many ways in which racial subordination still permeates American culture. 23 Moreover, some
constitutional scholars have argued that equal protection must be forward-looking, anticipating the shifting, subtle ways in which dominant
people maintain the status quo. 24 Still others, such as Charles Lawrence, have argued for circumvention of the backward/forward distinction, maintaining that equal protection must be both backwardlooking to remedy the effects of historical subordination and forwardlooking to fight racism and other types of subordination. 25
4.

Blindness or Consciousness

The fourth antinomy asks whether government actors should remain blind to traits the courts deem irrelevant or consciously consider
such traits in order to rectify discrimination based on those traits.
The answer to this question typically determines one's perspective on
equal protection analysis. Generally, conservative thinkers tend to
favor a blindness approach, while various progressive scholars typically
defend consciousness of the trait. Both sides of this antinomy are represented injustice Harlan's celebrated dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, in
which he asserted: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither
22

For example, with regard to one city's effort to remedy its awarding less than one

percent of construction contracts to minority businesses, the Court made dear that the city
would have to further identify its participation in past discrimination with particularity. See

City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (O'Connor, J., plurality
opinion). With respect to a federal program creating incentives for awarding contracts to
disadvantaged businesses, the Court held that it would subject consideration of race for
even benign purposes to strict scrutiny. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 226 (1995).
23
24

PATRICiAJ. WILMs,THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RiGH-rs (1991).

See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination:Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases,
100 HARv. L. REv. 78, 80-81 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientationand the Constitution:
A Note on the RelationshipBetween Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. Rrv. 1161,

1174-75 (1988).
25

See Charles R. Lawrence III, Each Other's Harvest:Diversity'sDeeperMeaning,31 U.S.F.

L. REv. 757, 765-66 (1997).
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knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." 26 While one interpreta27
tion of Justice Harlan's language supports the blindness approach,
one might argue that he used this imagery to decry the majority's use
of color-blindness to uphold racial segregation under the guise of formal equality. Harlan argued that the social context underlying racial
segregation made obvious the state's intent to exclude persons of
color-because of their inferiority-from railroad cars occupied by
white persons. 28 The Supreme Court's subsequent, unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education2 9 similarly dismissed the defense,
advanced by those advocating color-blindness, that racial segregation
operates equally to separate people according to assigned racial identities. Instead, the Court recognized the manifest social message of
racial hierarchy that underlies formally color-blind segregation.3 0
Commentators have exhaustively scrutinized the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Brown, seeming more suspicious of the Court's
invalidation of legislative choices than of the state legislatures' subordination of racial minorities.3 ' Yet Brown's result, invalidating de jure
racial segregation in public education, enjoys nearly unanimous support, even among many conservative commentators.a2 Perhaps this
consensus, rather than the scholarly hand wringing over doctrinal and
theoretical justifications, should inform our understanding of equal
26 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled ly
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Supreme Court adopted Justice

Harlan's language one hundred years later in Romerv. Evans,517 U.S. 620 (1996), to invalidate a law that explicitly targeted certain classes (gay, lesbian, and bisexual people) and
prohibited them from seeking legal protection from discrimination. See id. at 623.
27 Justice Harlan also argued, in a color-blind fashion, that the "fundamental objection" to the statute was that it interfered with the "personal freedom" of both white and
black persons to occupy the same public conveyance. See P/essy, 163 U.S. at 557.
28 As Justice Harlan explained,
Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose,
not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by
blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned
to white persons.... What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more
certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races,
than state enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored
citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in
public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will admit, is the real
meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.
Id. at 557, 560.
29 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30 See id. at 494.
31 See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HAuv.
L. REv. 1 (1959). Wechsler's article has been credited as posing "achallenge to legal scholars to justify Brown along lines of traditional, consent-based theories of democracy...."
FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIA.S ON CONSTITUTIONAL ILAW: THEMES FOR THE CONS TTION'S THniRD CENTURY 101 (2d ed. 1998).

32 See, e.g., FARBER ET AL., supra note 31, at 89-100 (describing the different ways in
which Alexander Bickel, Robert Bork, and Herbert Wechsler indicated agreement with
Brown's result, but not its reasoning).
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protection. The social consensus favoring Brown declares, at a minimum, that law shall not perpetuate a formal racial hierarchy in public
education. Interpreted more broadly, it suggests that we must consider the constitutionality of a law in relation to its social context.
Whether a narrower or broader interpretation of Brown endures,
the decision reveals the futility of the distinction between blindness
and consciousness. From a critical perspective, the choice between
blindness and consciousness begs the constitutional question. Blindness could mean that laws treating the races equally in a formal sense,
such as segregation laws, are constitutional, thus making Brown's result wrong. In contrast, blindness could mean that government cannot impose racial hierarchy's effects on people of any color, thus
legitimizing Brown's result. Accordingly, the harm is not the racial
classifications themselves (problematic though they may be) for which
blindness may be a formal cure. Instead, the harm is the racial hierarchy that these classifications serve. Therefore, the law must be conscious of how racial hierarchy operates in society in order to eliminate
its impact on people of all colors. 33 As Patricia Williams has
explained:
The rules may be colorblind, but people are not. The question remains, therefore, whether the law can truly exist apart from the
color-conscious society in which it exists, as a skeleton devoid of
flesh; or whether law is the embodiment of society, the reflection of
8 4
a particular citizenry's arranged complexity of relations.
5.

Classificationsor Classes

The fifth antinomy represents a particularly strange tm in equal
protection doctrine-the shift from protecting classes of people who
suffer prejudice, such as African Americans or females, to prohibiting
any use of classifications, such as race or sex, thus extending protection to dominant classes that historically have not suffered prejudice
(such as whites and males). In other words, by prohibiting legal recognition of any classes within a classification, the judiciary no longer
33

For an interesting analysis arguing that strict scrutiny should not apply to race-

conscious, nonpreferential affirmative action, see Michelle Adams, The Last Wave of Affirmative Action, 1998 Wisc. L. REv. 1395, 1436-38. Adams writes:

Race-conscious, nonpreferential affirmative action programs ensure enhanced and vigorous competition for benefits such as employment and
housing, and seek to even what has historically been an extraordinarily
skewed playing field. As such, these programs promote the American ideal
of a truly colorblind society and are necessary to ensure equal opportunity
for all its citizens.
Id. at 1463.
34 PatriciaJ. Williams, The ObligingShell (An InformalEssay on FormalEqual Opportunity),
in AIRa IDENmr 103, 121 (Dan Danielsen & Karen Engle eds., 1995).
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protects only classes marked "inferior" but also protects classes
marked "superior."
The remarkable thing about this turn is that it necessitated a
change of purpose that has remained virtually unmarked. Here,
again, the aftermath of Brown provides insight. While the search to
legitimize judicial protection of African Americans in Brown has proceeded, the Supreme Court meanwhile has extended judicial protection to members of the most dominant multiple-identity group, white
men, when they were denied opportunities in the following contexts:
to compete for sixteen percent of the seats in a medical school,3 5 to
attend an all-female nursing school,3 6 to compete for thirty percent of
construction contracts,3 7 and to enjoy federal monetary incentives
supporting their bids for government contracts.38 This judicial protection of white men from legislative choices disfavoring them has not
produced a scholarly search for justification equivalent to that following Brown. Why not? Why was it counterintuitive that subordinated
groups might require judicial protection but somehow intuitive that
dominant groups would?
The Supreme Court's answer lies in its shift from class to classification-from protecting subordinated classes (such as African Americans) to prohibiting any use of those classifications the Court deems
irrelevant (such as race). This transformation remains confusing considering the Court's ongoing use of a class-based approach to deny
heightened protection to other classes. For example, in a recent decision, the Court again blended class and classification when it followed
a class-based approach in concluding that older persons, as a class,
have not suffered historical discrimination and do not constitute a discrete and insular minority. Therefore, the Court determined that age
is not a suspect classification.3 9 Yet the Court has had no difficulty
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 275, 319-20 (1978).
See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 720, 733 (1982).
37 See City of Richmond v. J. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
38 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 206 (1995).
39
See Kimel v. Florida Bd.of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 645-46 (2000). The Kimel Court
explained:
Older persons, again, unlike those who suffer discrimination on the basis of
race or gender, have not been subjected to a "history of purposeful unequal
treatment." Old age also does not define a discrete and insular minority
because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will experience
it. Accordingly,... age is not a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. (citations omitted). Similarly, in San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodrigue, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a class of residents of impoverished school
districts did not have "the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with
such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection
from the majoritarian political process." Id. at 28. During the same term the Court decided Rodriguez, it also decided Frontierov. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), in which the
35

36
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extending and defending heightened judicial protection of whites,
who also do not meet the criteria of suspectness and, indeed, continue to enjoy benefits derived from their historical and ongoing ad40
vantages over less dominant groups.
The Court has constructed this extension of heightened judicial
protection of whites in the name of individualism. As Justice
O'Connor wrote in Adarand:
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution protect
persons, not groups. It follows from that principle that all governmental action based on race-a group classification long recognized
as 'in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited'should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the
personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been
41
infringed.
In its recent decision invalidating a federal law prohibiting age discrimination by state employers, however, the Court clarified that the
only individuals entitled to this personal right to equal protection are
42
those who are members of groups that receive heightened scrutiny.
plurality opinion argued that women met the test for suspectness. See id. at 682 (plurality
opinion). The Court now treats sex classifications as quasi-suspect, deserving "at least"
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 686 (plurality opinion); seeUnited States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 531 (1996). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTTUTLIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
PouCs 601-05 (1997) (describing the "emergence of intermediate scrutiny" for gender
classifications).
40

See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1709, 1766-68 (1993)

(arguing that white supremacy has been "nurtured over the years").
41
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (citation omitted).
For an earlier statement of this approach, see Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 295-97 (1978), which argues that equal protection extends to all individuals,
not to certain groups. For a critique of this approach, see, for example, Owen M. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-57 (1976), who argues
for a group-disadvantaging principle as the standard for equal protection. See also Tracy E.
Higgins & Laura A. Rosenbury, Agency, Equality and Anti-DiscriminationLaw, 85 CoRNEL. L.
REv. 1194, 1213-15 (2000) (criticizing the Supreme Court's group-blind standard and arguing against importing it from constitutional doctrine to statutory interpretation).
42
See Kimel 120 S. Ct. at 645-47. The Court explained:
[T]he constitutionality of state classifications on the basis of age cannot be
determined on a person-by-person basis. Our Constitution permits States
to draw lines on the basis of age when they have a rational basis for doing so
at a class-based level, even if it 'is probably not true' that those reasons are
valid in the majority of cases.
i&; see also id at 646 ("Application of the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] therefore starts with a presumption in favor of requiring the employer to make an individualized
determination.... Measured against the rational basis standard of our equal protection
jurisprudence, the ADEA plainly imposes substantially higher burdens on state employ.
ers."); id. at 647 ("Under the Constitution.... States may rely on age as a proxy for other
characteristics.... Congress, through the ADEA, has effectively elevated the standard for
analyzing age discrimination to heightened scrutiny." (citations omitted)). Six weeks after
deciding Kimel the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion holding that a complaint
brought by a class of one alleging an intentional, irrational, and arbitrary zoning action
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Intent or Effects

The sixth antinomy asks whether equal protection prohibits not
only prejudicial intent but also disproportionate effects. Equal protection jurisprudence distinguishes laws that discriminate on their face
from laws that are facially neutral but have a discriminatory or disparate impact. Although courts presume the existence of prejudicial intent when a law is facially discriminatory, current equal protection
doctrine requires that plaintiffs alleging disparate impact prove discriminatory intent as a condition of receiving heightened judicial
scrutiny and protection.4 3
The history of equal protection doctrine has taken another perverse twist as a result of this dichotomy between intent and effects. As
courts increased their enforcement of equal protection, legislatures
gradually removed many facially discriminatory laws from the books,
only to replace them with more subtle means of perpetuating racial
hierarchy. 44 When prejudicial intent was overt, the Supreme Court
declared that a law could not "violate equal protection solely because
of the motivations of the men who voted for it."4 5 Once the prejudicial intent of a law became less evident, disparate impact replaced facial discrimination as the culprit in contemporary lawsuits challenging
invidious discrimination. However, as an increasing number of plaintiffs relied on disparate impact, judges changed equal protection doctrine to require that these plaintiffs must first prove that the
legislature harbored a discriminatory intent. Thus the Court now requires that plaintiffs show that the government "selected or reaffirmed
a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
46
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."
Proving any individual decision maker's state of mind, let alone a
collective mind-set, is extremely difficult. 47 Moreover, although this
stated a sufficient equal protection claim. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S. Ct 1073,
1074-75 (2000) (per curiam).
43
See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245-48 (1976).
44 For an illustration of the various historical reasons offered to justify racial subordination, see Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No LongerProtects: The Evolving Forms of StatusEnforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111, 1119 (1997) ("Assuming that something of
value is at stake in such a struggle, it is highly unlikely that the regime that emerges from
reform will redistribute material and dignitary 'goods' in a manner that significantly disadvantages the beneficiaries of the prior, contested regime."); see alsoMary Becker, The Sixties
Shift to FormalEquality and the Courts: An Argumentfor Pragmatismand Politics,40 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 209, 260 (1998) (incorporating Siegel's equal protection analysis into a consideration of a move away from formal equality).
45 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).
46 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
47 The Supreme Court has identified the foliowing as relevant factors for finding discriminatory intent: 1) the impact of the government's action; 2) the historical background
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burden of proof technically applies equally to all disparate impact
plaintiffs, the plaintiffs who bring disparate impact claims typically are
members of subordinated, not dominant, groups. 48 For example, a
plaintiff challenging government action that disproportionately impacts African Americans has the burden of proving intent. But courts
do not impose this burden of proof on most white plaintiffs. Because
legislatures rarely harbor prejudicial intent against whites, a white
plaintiff typically challenges so-called reverse discrimination caused by
government efforts to assist racial minorities, like affirmative action.
Because affirmative action programs usually employ an overt racial
classification, courts often assert that these programs involve facial discrimination, which does not require proof of discriminatory intent.
The bottom line is that the typical claim brought by a white plaintiff
challenging affirmative action enjoys strict judicial scrutiny of the government's action even without proof of prejudicial intent, while the
typical discrimination claim brought by an African-American plaintiff
suffers judicial deference to the government unless the plaintiff can
prove the government's actual discriminatory intent. This effectively
creates a double standard.
7.

Public or Private

The seventh antinomy turns on the prevailing interpretation that
the Constitution imposes the duty of equal protection on only certain
government action. 4 9 This state action requirement depends on a distinction between public and private actors. A narrow view of state action includes only actions taken by government officials acting within
the sphere of their proper authority.50 A broader view of state action
includes all private actions that benefit from governmental recogniof the action; 3) the sequence of events leading to the action; 4) departures from normal
procedure or substantive considerations; and 5) evidence in legislative or administrative
history. See Arlington Heights,429 U.S. at 266-68. These factors reinforce judicial deference
to the government by presuming that discriminatory intent would be signaled by explicit
statements in the record or obvious departures from normal behavior patterns.
48 This double standard (disfavoring disadvantaged plaintiffs and favoring advantaged
plaintiffs) is particularly ironic given the formal equality underlying the Court's current
equal protection reasoning.
49
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to mandate that both the
states and the federal government provide equal protection of the laws. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the states, see U.S. CoNsv. amend.
XIV, § 1, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment includes an equal protection component that applies to the federal government, seeBolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
498-500 (1954). An important difference between the federal and state governments is
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes the federal government to enforce the requirement that states provide equal protection. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,

§ 5.

50 This narrower view of state action presumably fits the more limited sphere of government action existing prior to expansion of the administrative welfare state.
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or those
tion or support, such as those that enjoy government subsidy
51
rights.
private
of
enforcement
judicial
on
that depend
As with the other antinomies, the Supreme Court has adopted
the conservative approach: equal protection doctrine has embraced
the public/private dichotomy and endorsed only the narrow view of
state action. As a result, most so-called private actions not involving
52
government officials are immune from equal protection challenges.
In yet another interesting twist, the Supreme Court recently expanded
state immunity to include immunity from congressional age discrimination regulation, thereby protecting a broader range of state actions
from congressional attempts to enforce the equal protection
53
mandate.
Among progressive scholars, Robin West has theorized that the
public/private distinction rests in the Constitution's firm commitment
to a negative view of liberty that "necessarily creates the sphere of noninterference and privacy within which the abuse of private power can
proceed unabated."54 Moreover, West argues that this negative conception of liberty confines the Constitution's conception of equality to
a "liberal understanding" that protects only universal attributes such
as autonomy and dignity, rather than those attributes that mark "non51
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1948) (holding that racially exclusionary covenants are not enforceable in court).
52 See, e.g., CHF EUNSKY, supra note 39, at 385 (1997) (explaining that the Constitution "generally does not apply to private entities or actors").
53 See, e.g, Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 645-46 (2000) (holding that
states retain Eleventh Amendment immunity from the federal statute prohibiting age discrimination in employment because Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and thereby allowing age discrimination in public employment

that is rationally related to legitimate state interests). In Kimel, the Court held that sovereign immunity protected states from age discrimination suits brought by state employees.
Id at 646-47. To reach this conclusion, the Court had to hurdle several obstacles. First,
although the text of the Eleventh Amendment only protects states from suits by out-of-state
or foreign plaintiffs, the Court noted that it has long extended its application to suits
brought by citizens against their own state. See id at 640 (citing, inter alia, U.S. CONST.
amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.") and Hans v.
Lousiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). Second, although Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
affirmatively grants Congress "the authority to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity,"
although congressional determinations about what legislation is needed to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment are entitled to "much deference" and given "wide latitude," and
although congressional power under Section 5 extends to prohibiting "a somewhat
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's
text," the Court nevertheless held that it will invalidate any congressional enforcement of
the Fourteenth Amendment where there is an insufficient "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end."
Id at 644 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
54 Robin L. West, ConstitutionalSkepticism, 72 B.U. L. Ray. 765, 778 (1992); see ROBIN
WEST, PROGRESSIVE CoNSrITurIoNALjsM: RECONSTRUGrING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

166 (1994).
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universal subordinate groups." 55 West ultimately contends that the
Constitution's liberal understanding of equality not only prevents its
use as a mechanism to challenge most subordination, which lies in
concentrations of private power, but also assures its aggressive protection of such power hierarchies. Nevertheless, West argues that "[t ] he
Court is wrong to read into the Fourteenth Amendment a state action
requirement, not because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits private action as well, but rather, because the Fourteenth Amendment,
properly and naturally read, prohibits state inaction in the face of pri'5 6
vate injustice or violation.
8.

Process or Substance

The eighth antinomy relates to whether equal protection is ultimately a procedural or substantive commitment. In CaroleneProducts's
familiar footnote four, the Supreme Court suggested that courts
should more carefully scrutinize legislative decisions that harm discrete and insular minorities. 57 This construction engendered the suspect class strand of equal protection doctrine. 58 Building on Carolene
Products,John Hart Ely, in his landmark theory of representation-reinforcement, defended thejudiciary's use of equal protection to correct
defects in the legislative process. 59 Ely reasoned that judges may, and
should, apply heightened scrutiny to legislative choices that harm
60
those groups that are under-represented in the political process.
Many commentators have criticized both the CaroleneProductsjustification for scrutinizing legislative decisions and Ely's extension of it.
For example, Bruce Ackerman has contended that, rather than supporting judicial protection of discrete and insular minorities, the
political-process-correction theory actually justifies judicial protection
of "anonymous and diffuse" groups because they are more likely to
suffer political disadvantage. 6' Charles Lawrence has argued that a
political-process-correction justification limits equal protection's
reach to instances of discriminatory legislative intent, thus insuffi55
56

West, supra note 54, at 778.
Robin West, Is Progressive ConstitutionalismPossible, 4

WIDENER

L. SYMP.J. 1, 12

(1999).
57
58

See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
See discussion supra Part I.A.5 (regarding the fifth antinomy between classification

or classes).
59
SeeJoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-Rusr. A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW 135-79
(1980).
60 See id. at 7%-77, 101-04; see also Nice, supra note 5, at 142-49 (considering Ely's representation-reinforcement theory in relation to equal protection's co-constitutive third
strand).
61 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. RE:v. 713, 724 (1985).
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ciently enforcing the broader substantive equal protection mandate. 62
Like the other antinomies, the procedure/substance discourse has
63
not achieved progressive inroads in equal protection jurisprudence.
9.

Singular or Multiple

The ninth antinomy turns on one of the most criticized aspects of
identity-based equality theory--the isolation and treatment of one aspect of an individual's identity as singular (sometimes called "essential") 64-thereby ignoring and marginalizing the multiplicity of a
person's identities. The ninth antinomy's choice between singular
identity and multiple identities has garnered increasing attention
among progressive scholars. Both Kimberl6 Crenshaw and Angela
Harris, for example, criticize feminist theorists for treating the experiences of white women as the norm. 65 Crenshaw has illustrated that
feminist literature criticizing the social assignment of the private
realm to women based on the stereotype of women as dependent and
passive fails to acknowledge that historically, many African-American
women have worked outside of the home and have been stereotyped
as overly-strong matriarchs. 66 Similarly, Harris has illustrated that the
dominant template of rape (symbolized by "the strange black man in
the bushes") is a white women's prototype that leaves out the para62
See Charles R. Lawrence m1,The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
UnconsciousRacism, 39 STAN. L. Rzv. 317, 345-49 (1987); see also Laurence H. Tribe, The
PuzzlingPersistenceofProcess-BasedConstitutionalTheories, 89 YALE LJ. 1063, 1077 (1980) (criticizing process-based approaches to deciding the question of whom to protect). Tribe

argues:
The crux of any determination that a law unjustly discriminates against a
group-blacks, or women, or even men-is not that the law emerges from a
flawed process, or that the burden it imposes affects an independently fundamental right, but that the law is part of a pattern that denies those subject
to it a meaningful opportunity to realize their humanity. Necessarily, such
an approach must look beyond process to identify and proclaim fundamental substantive rights.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
63 See, e.g., Kimberl. Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The Contradictionsof MainstreamConstitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1683 passim (1998) (criticizing constitutional process
theory).
64 I do not use the word "essential" because the concept of "essentialism" has been
used somewhat differently within various discourses. Some scholars employ the term essential to mean singular and universal, as compared to multiple, see, e.g., MARY BECKER ET
At., FEMINISTJuRISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 118-35 (1994), while others use it
to mean fixed or immutable or natural, see, e.g., DIANA Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAING: FmFuNISM, NAruRE & DIFFERENCE at xi (1989). See also infraPart IA10 for a discussion regard-

ing the tenth antinomy between fixed or fluid identity.
65 See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 152-60; Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585-86 (1990); see also Martha R. Mahoney,
Whiteness and Women, In Practiceand Theory: A Reply to CatharineMacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. &
FEInIss 217, 221 (1993) (criticizing MacKinnon's method as reproducing "a white norm"
by stripping away differentiations among women).
66

See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 154-56.
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digm experience of black women (symbolized by "the white employer
in the kitchen or bedroom").67 Further, other theorists claim that
feminism and critical race theory presume a universal heterosexual
experience 68 and that queer legal theory often presumes a universal
69
white and nonpoor experience.
These are a few examples of the many instances in which scholars
have identified analytical errors caused by a singular identity focus in
legal theory. Given that identity remains a basis for subordination,
the question remains how scholars can challenge identity-based subordination without reifying narrow identity categories that fail to capture the whole of any person's experience. Although some
postmodern scholars reject any reliance on identity, others defend its
use as a means to further the solidarity of subordinated communities7"
and to pursue anti-subordination ends. 71 Again, neither pole of this
antinomy provides an adequate solution, leaving equal protection jurisprudence without a theoretical basis for recognizing new groups or
rights in need of legal protection.
Harris, supra note 65, at 598.
For a critique of feminist theory, see Patricia A. Cain, FeministJurisprudence:Grounding the Theories,4 BERKELEYWoMEN'S LJ. 191, 213 (1989) ("The problem with current feminist theory is that the more abstract and universal it is, the more it fails to relate to the lived
reality of many women. One problem with much feminist legal theory is that it has abstr-acted and universalized from the experience of heterosexual women." (footnote omitted)), and Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective,Lesbian Experience, and the Risk of Essentialism,
2 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 43, 46-54 (1994). For a critique of critical race theory, see Darren
Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity, CriticalRace Theory
and Anti-Racist Politics,47 BuFF. L. REv. 1, 116 (1999). Hutchinson asserts:
The various internal critics of progressive social movements have compiled
a formidable array of works that allow willing scholars and activists to disavow narrow and partial theories of equality and to replace them with more
complete and inclusive models.... By offering multidimensionality as a
paradigm for theorizing equality, I hope to push willing anti-racists (and
other equality theorists) along this vital path of racial reconstruction.
Id.; see also BLkcK MEN ON RAcE, GENDER, AND SExuArr (Devon W. Carbado ed., 1999)
(featuring wide variety of antisubordination agendas).
69 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen:A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian
Legal Theory and PoliticalDiscourse; 29 CoNNm.
L. REv. 561, 566 (1997) (proposing a "'multidimensional framework'-a multidimensionality-to analyze and challenge sexual
subordination").
70 See, e.g., Regina Austin, "The Black Community, "Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1769, 1769-1775 (1992); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: TheJurisprudence of Reconstruction, 82 GAL. L. REv. 741, 766-78 (1994).
71 See Francisco Valdes, Afterword: Beyond Sexual Orientationin QueerLegal Theory: Majoritaianism,Multidimensionality, and Responsibility in SocialJustice Scholarship orLegal Scholars as
CulturalWarriors, 75 DENY. U. L. REv. 1409, 1448 (1998) (urging "strategic quasi-essentialism" as a means of using identity to further antisubordination); Stephanie M. Wildman,
Reflections on Whiteness and Latina/o CriticalTheory, 2 HARv. LA-TINO L. Rstv. 307, 311 (1997)
("Naming Latinas/os, being strategically essentialist, instead of relying on the umbrella
categories 'race' or 'people of color,' can help us reveal the hierarchies that exist within
the category race.").
67
68
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Fixed or Fluid

The last antinomy is also identity-based, and asks whether we understand identity as either fixed or fluid. This antinomy marks a disagreement between those committed to identity-based movements and
those who envision a post-identity world. One context where this debate has played out is discourse between gay rights activists and queer
legal theorists. Gay rights litigators frequently argue that gay people
have an absolutely or predominantly fixed (sometimes called "essential"72 ) same-sex sexual orientation, which, they argue, should not
serve as a basis for discrimination. 73 Queer legal theorists, however,
have challenged that sex, gender, and sexual orientation are not
fixed, but rather socially constructed, fluid, indeterminate, contingent, and complex. 74
A different version of this antinomy plays out between gay rights
supporters and conservatives. Conservatives seemingly have conceded
that sexual identity is fluid, but only in the sense that they believe
sexual identity is based on sexual conduct. Indeed, the debate over
whether gay people suffer discrimination because of their sexual ori72 See discussion regarding essentialism, supra note 64.
73 For an example of such reasoning in a judicial opinion regarding whether a state
constitution's prohibition of sex discrimination proscribes discrimination based on sexual

orientation, see Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 70 (Haw. 1993) (Bums,J.,concurring). Judge
Burns asserted that
the questions whether heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and
asexuality are "biologically fated" are relevant questions of fact which must
be determined before the issue presented in this case can be answered. If
the answers are yes, then each person's "sex" includes both the "biologically
fated" male-female difference and the "biologically-fated" sexual orientation difference, and the Hawaii Constitution probably bars the State from
discriminating against the sexual orientation difference by permitting opposite-sex Hawaii Civil Law Marriages and not permitting same-sex Hawaii
Civil Law Marriages.
Id.
74 SeeJunrrH BUrLER, BODIES THAT MAx-ER: ON THE DiscuRSmIV LIMITS OF "SEx" 10
(1993) (finding that "construction is neither a single act nor a causal process initiated by a
subject and culminating in a set of fixed effects" that "not only takes place in time, but is
itself a temporal process which operates through the reiteration of norms; sex is both produced and destabilized in the course of this reiteration."); id at 239 ("For surely it is as
unacceptable to insist that relations of sexual subordination determine gender position as
it is to separate radically forms of sexuality from the workings of gender norms."); JUDrrH
BunER , GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINisM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTrFY 142 (1990) (stating
that "[t]he foundationalist reasoning of identity politics tends to assume that an identity
must first be in place in order for political interests to be elaborated and, subsequently,
political action to be taken," and further asserting "that there need not be a 'doer behind
the deed,' but that the 'doer' is variably constructed in and through the deed"); Martha M.
Ertman, Oscar Wilde: ParadoxicalPoster Childfor Both Identity and Post-Identity, 25 L. & Soc.
INQUmY 153 (2000) (using Wilde to show the historical contingency of sociolegal understandings of same-sex sexuality); Katherine M. Franke, The CentralMistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregationof Sexfrom Gender,144 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1, 1-9 (1995) (arguing that
sex is as socially constructed as gender).
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entation and status or because of their sexual conduct has sidetracked much of the litigation and theory about whether the Constitution protects gay people from discrimination. For example, in his dissent in Romer v. Evans,Justice Scalia argued that because the Supreme
Court has allowed states to criminalize same-sex sexual conduct and
because such conduct defines the class of gay people, they cannot receive legal protection from discrimination based on their status or
identity. 75 While the Evans majority did not directly address the issue,
otherjudicial opinions argue that gay people are defined by their orientation, not their conduct. 7 6 As queer legal theorists continue to
deconstruct the notion of fixed identity, however, the argument be77
tween status and conduct continues to confound the discourse.
B.

The Prevailing (Conservative) Preferences

Despite critical legal theorists' criticism of the falsity of such dichotomies, these antinomies frame the discourse about equal protection theory. Moreover, a bird's eye view of these antinomies reveals a
second apparent pattern: a hierarchical arrangement prioritizing the
conservative preference over the progressive one. 78 This is so even
though progressive scholars and litigators persistently articulate compelling arguments on behalf of the progressive preferences. The fact
remains that judges developing equal protection doctrine generally
follow conservative patterns: they (1) adopt an assimilationist (not antisubordination) goal; 79 (2) treat subordinated persons the same as
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en
bane, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
77 See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biolog:A Citique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. RE. 503, 507-10 (1994) (arguing that immutability
of any trait, including sexual orientation, should not be relevant for equal protection purposes). For a detailed examination of "the recalcitrance of the status-conduct distinction"
in Title VII law, see Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 Tax. L. REv. 317, 432 (1997).
78 For an argument that such a hierarchy should not be surprising, see, for example,
Crenshaw, supra note 11, at 1372-73 (applying the philosophy ofJacques Derrida to argue
that racism follows the pattern of Western thought that is structured into oppositional
dichotomies arranged in a hierarchical order).
79 SeeAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) ("In the eyes of government, we arejust one
race here. It is American."); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06
(1989) ("The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to
personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences
based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."). Justice Ginsburg's opinion for
the Court in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-34 (1996), reflects both equal protection goals when she describes full citizenship as "equal opportunity to aspire, achieve,
participate in and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities,"
but explains that sex classifications "may not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of women." Id. (citation omitted).
75
76
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(not different than) dominant persons;8 0 (3) look backward toward
remediation (not forward toward achieving substantive equality);81
(4) require blindness (not consciousness) of the marked and marking
83
trait;8 2 (5) focus on the classification (not the disadvantaged class);

(6) require proof of prejudicial intent (not disproportionate effects) ;84 (7) limit equal protection's reach to public (not private) action;8 5 (8) focus on process (not substance);8 6 (9) understand identity
as singular (not multiple);8 7 and (10) treat identity as fixed (not
fluid) .88
This brief overview of the ten antinomies of equal protection,
while far from exhaustive, shows that the antinomies themselves may
exhaust the discursive possibilities within their parameters. One way
out of this stagnate and limited understanding may well be a co-constitutive theory of law and society taking shape within the law and society

scholarship.

80 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 224 ("[A]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to
demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitutionjustify any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny.").
But see Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 471 (1981) ("We need not be medical
doctors to discern that young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse. Only women may become
pregnant. . .. ").
81 SeejA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 505-06 (requiring local government to identify evidence of specific past discrimination as one necessary element of defending its affirmative
action program).
82 See id. at 494 (plurality opinion) ("[T]he standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification.").
83 See Adarand,515 U.S. at 230 ("[Any individual suffers an injury when he or she is
disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race, whatever that race may be.").
84 See Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (describing "discriminatory purpose" as taking "a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group"); Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (requiring that the "invidious quality" of a law "must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose"); see alsoJA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 500 ("Racial
classifications are suspect, and that means that simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot suffice.").
85 See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-82 (1972) (holding that the
racially discriminatory behavior of a private club, licensed by the state to sell liquor, did not
constitute "state action," and therefore the Fourteenth Amendment was not implicated);
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883) (holding that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies only to state action).
86 See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("[Homosexuals are not without political power....").
87 SeeJefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545-57 (1972) (separating the analysis of the
disparate racial impact of Texas's welfare system from the analysis of the low-income status
of the plaintiffi).
88 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality opinion) (treating
sex as an "immutable characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth").
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II
TIE PROMISE OF A Co-CONSTITUTIVE APPROACH
Part I of this Article revealed the antinomic discourse both created by and constraining equal protection theory and doctrine. This
Part explores what co-constitutive theory offers equal protection discourse. I suggest that co-constitutive theory enhances equal protection discourse by providing a framework for both understanding and
transcending equal protection's antinomies.
Two considerations suggest that law and society scholarship is not
the most likely source of a theory that helps constitutional law out of
its antinomic binds. First, law and society scholarship is not known for
developing grand theory.8 9 Second, the grounded-theory characteristic of most law and society research 9° does not seem to fit well with
what one prominent law and society scholar has termed the
"[i]nflated claims and ambitions" of "constitutional theology."9 ' Nevertheless, law and society scholarship has been at the forefront of the
major turns in twentieth-century legal theory. As one outgrowth of
the legal realist movement, law and society scholarship at first utilized
and promoted its instrumentalist, 9 2 problem-solving focus. 93 It then
shifted its focus to exploiting the so-called gap paradigm-"the gap
between the ideals and reality of liberal legalism" 94-- by empirically
89 See Marc Galanter & Mark Alan Edwards, Introduction: The Path of the Law Ands,
1997 Wis. L. REv. 375, 383 ("At the risk of overgeneralizing, we would say that law and
society scholars tend to be less enthralled by comprehensive theory, more willing to muddle through with partial theories, and less persuaded that theory can yield up unambiguous prescriptions for policy.").
90

See id.

91 Lawrence M. Friedman, The Law and Society Movemen, 38 STAN. L. Rxv. 763, 777
(1986). Professor Friedman further describes much constitutional scholarship as focused
on "the endless search for the magic bullet in fourteenth amendment cases" and "the
endless search for the key to constitutional problems." Id at 774, 776. Yet his disdain for
the lofty aims of constitutional scholarship (as compared to the careful grounding of empirical work) itself risks the criticism of perpetuating a false dichotomy between law and
society.
92 See id. at 764 ("The law and society movement presupposes an instrumental theory
of law."); Austin Sarat & Thomas . Kearns, Beyond the GreatDivide: Forms of Legal Scholarship
and Everyday Life, in LAw IN EVERYDAY LIwE 21, 26 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.Kearns eds.,
1993) (describing instrumental legal scholarship as "begin[ning] with legal rules (or with
cognate legal standards) and end[ing] in an examination of their effectiveness in regulating or changing everyday life, that is, in a study of the extent to which this law has, or has
failed to have, the intended role in shaping the domain of activity in question.").
93 See Friedman, supra note 91, at 775 ("The law and society movement inside American law schools got seriously underway in the 1920s and 1930s. One trait of this early
phase was the idea-or fallacy-that social science techniques could solve actual legal
problems."); Munger, supra note 2, at 95 (describing the problem-focused research of the
law and society movement as examining law "within a framework constructed from the
qualities or characteristics of actors and their settings not attended to by the legal system").
94 Munger, supra note 2, at 98; see also Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36
STAN. L. Ra. 57, 122 (1984) (describing "the gap between legal principles in high-sounding pretension and in seamy operation").
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confirming critical claims regarding law's "lack of instrumental capacity and its biased distributive effects."9 5 After articulating this gap paradigm, law and society scholarship supplemented its demonstration of
96
the gap with an internal criticism of the gap paradigm's limitations.
One outgrowth of the effort to move beyond the gap paradigm is the
recent law and society scholarship that is developing more general
theory,9 7 such as constitutive theory.98
Law and society's constitutive theory posits "the fundamentally
constitutive character of legal relations in social life."99 As Robert
Gordon has described it, law "is omnipresent in the very marrow of
society,"' 0 0 meaning that
the power exerted by a legal regime consists less in the force that it
can bring to bear against violators of its rules than in its capacity to
persuade people that the world described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person would want
to live.10 1
95
Munger, supra note 2, at 101; see also Gordon, supra note 94, at 69 ("[E]mpirical
investigations of the law 'in action' have exploded forever the Formalist fantasy that a universal scheme of neutral, general rules controls equally and impersonally the discretion of
every class and faction of civil society.").
96 See Munger, supra note 2, at 96 n.39 (collecting critical sources, especially Richard
L. Abel, Taking Stock, 14 L. & Soc'Y REv. 429, 438-39 (1980)); id. at 99 (summarizing that
"[t]he gap paradigm has been 'exhausted'; that is, critics say it produces repetitive findings
that the legal system does not live up to its ideals while it reinforces those ideals by failing
to offer a coherent alternative understanding of the role of the legal system").
97 See id. at 123 (describing sociology of law as "moving slowly toward a general theory
of the role of law in society"); id. at 124 (foreseeing "opportunities to develop satisfactory
general understandings of the role of law based on the evolving work on 'constitutive'
theory, theory of the state, the contextual actor, reformation of bureaucracies, the postindustrial legal profession, the interpretation of law, and many other points of creative
research activity").
98 For an overview of constitutive theory's development, seeJohn Brigham, The Constitution of Interests: Institutionalism, CLS, and New Approaches to Sociolegal Studies, 10 YALE J.L. &
HuMAN. 421, 425-29 (1998). Like the development and criticism of the gap paradigm, law
and society scholars have engaged in an internal debate regarding the recent turn to critical theory, including constitutive theory. See Frank Munger, Mapping Law and Society, in
CROSSING BouNDARIEs, supra note 3, at 21, at 34-39. In my view, both traditional empirical
and critical theoretical research have made, and will continue to make, important contributions to sociolegal understandings.
99 Gordon, supra note 94, at 104. Professor David Trubek has explained that
[law, like other aspects of belief systems, helps to define the role of an
individual in society and the relations with others that make sense. At the
same time that law is a system of belief, it is also a basis of organization, a
part of the structure in which action is embedded. In this way, law forms
consciousness and influences outcomes.
David M. Trubek, Where the Action Is: CriticalLegal Studies and Empiricim,36 STAN. L. REv.
575, 604 (1984). See generally HuNT, supra note 2 passim (exploring themes in sociology of
law).
100 Gordon, supra note 94, at 109.
101 Id.; see also Sarat & Kearns, supranote 92, at 30 ("Law is part of the everyday world,
contributing powerfully to the apparently stable, taken-for-granted quality of that world
and to the generally shared sense that as things ar, so must they be.").
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Some law and society scholars have come to believe that the relation
between law and society is not unidirectional; rather, "legal life and
10 2 I
everyday social life are mutually conditioning and constraining."
use the term "co-constitutive" to emphasize the mutual relations of law
03
and society.'
Some scholars view co-constitutive theory as depending on
"decentering" law, that is, shifting the research focus from law produced by institutional legal actors to the understandings and practices
of law drawn from wider society. 10 4 Decentered research may be espe102 Alan Hunt, Law, Community, and Everyday Life: Yngvesson's Virtuous Citizens and
Disruptive Subjects, 21 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 173, 178-79 (1996); see also EWxcK & SxaEY, supra

note 4, at 22 (1998) ("Because law is both an embedded and an emergent feature of social
life, it collaborates with other social structures ... to infuse meaning and constrain social
action."); Sarat & Kearns, supra note 92, at 55 ("Law is continuously shaped and reshaped
by the ways it is used, even as law's constitutive power constrains patterns of usage."). Viewing law as part of, rather than distinct from, society is similar to the sociological account of
statutory antidiscrimination law offered by Robert Post. See Robert Post, PreudicialAppearances: The Logic ofAmerican AntidiscriminationLaw, 88 CAt.. L. REv. 1, 17 (2000) (noting that
"antidiscrimination law is itself a social practice, which regulates other social practices, because the latter have become for one reason or another controversial").
103
Following the body of law and society scholarship that is exploring co-constitutive
theory, I use "constitutive" to mean "making something what it is" and "co-constitutive" to
mean "mutually making things what they are." I do not mean to imply that law necessarily
or completely makes society what it is or that society necessarily or completely makes law
what it is. One need only agree that each at least partially shapes the other, a proposition
that is likely self-evident to most readers. Yet some may not agree with the co-constitutive
view of law and society. As one possibility, consider John Rawls's famous distinction between two logical conceptions of rules. SeeJOHN RAWLS, Two Concepts ofRules, in COLLECTrD
PAPERS 20, 20-46 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). Rawls characterizes one type-"rules of
thumb" or summary rules-as those rules that are constituted by social practices (practices
that constitute rules). See id. at 34-36, 40. He describes the second type-defining rules or
rules of practice-as those rules that constitute practices. See id. at 36-39. Rawls suggests
that legal arguments relate more to defining rules (rules that constitute practices). See id.
at 43 n.27. Departing from this analysis, a co-constitutive view of law and society suggests
that law might have characteristics of both types of rules. In other words, legal rules both
constitute, and are constituted by, social practices.
How does Rawls's distinction relate to a co-constitutive approach? Is the Rawlsian account inconsistent with the co-constitutive approach? Raws might reject a co-constitutive
approach for two reasons. First, he denies that rules and practices have a chicken-and-egg
problem, arguing instead that: (1) for a rule of thumb, the practice comes first logically
and constitutes the rules; and (2) for a defining rule, the rule comes first logically and
constitutes the practice. See id. at 34, 36. Second, Rawls posits that each rule is one type or
the other. See id.at 40. One also can argue that Rawls might embrace a co-constitutive
approach. Each conception of rules recognizes a unidirectional interaction between rules
and practices. One might combine Rawls's two unidirectional interactions to get something resembling the co-constitutive approach.
For now, it seems to me that comparing a co-constitutive approach to the Rawsian
approach underscores that the co-constitutive approach posits simultaneously and mutually constitutive relations, rather than independent and mutually exclusive unidirectional
relations, between legal rules and social practices. The issues raised by this comparison
merit a fuller account, which I leave to another day or other scholars.
104 See, e.g., MIcHAEL W. McCANN,RiGHTS AT WoRK: PAY EQUIFy REFORM AND THE Pou.
TICs OF LEGAL MOBILIZATON 278-310 (1994); see also Munger, supra note 2, at 120-21 (supporting law and society's decentered research with Michel Foucault's insight that power
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cially helpful in revealing the influence of society and culture on
law. 10 5 Yet a decentered approach is not necessary to co-constitutive
theory. 10 6 This Article's call for exploration of co-constitutive understandings of equal protection encourages a standard legal focusanalysis of United States Supreme Court decision making. Co-constitutive theory offers insights not only for those interpreting constitutional decisions but also for the Supreme Court's own interpretation
of the Constitution.
What is the relation between equal protection's antinomies and a
co-constitutive theory of law and society? On one level, co-constitutive
theory explains how the antinomic discourse frames the debate about
inequality. First, because of the nature of antinomies, the alternatives
are viewed as posing choices between two conflicting and mutually
exclusive principles. For example, should courts interpret equal protection to require elimination of subordination or promotion of assimilation? Should courts follow the approach of sameness or
difference, look backward or forward, consider or ignore the distinguishing trait, focus on the class or the classification, prohibit intent
or effects, limit public or private action, enforce procedural or substantive protection, and treat identity as singular or multiple and as
fixed or fluid? Courts resolve each purported conflict by choosing
only one of the two alternatives, in effect assigning one alternative to
the legal realm and relegating the other alternative to the societal
sphere. Second, because of the co-constitutive nature of sociolegal
discourse, the antinomies are constantly reinforced in both social and
legal discourses. One comes to view them as comprehensively identifying available options. Over time, this reinforcement limits our ability to imagine other alternatives.
The role of co-constitutive theory is not limited to explaining how
equal protection discourse fossilized into an antinomic framework. I
suggest that co-constitutive theory offers an approach for disrupting
and transcending the antinomies. Put simply, co-constitutive theory
suggests that the antinomic alternatives are not mutually exclusive,
emanates from everywhere); Sarat & Kearns, supra note 92, at 55 ("In our view, scholarship
on law in everyday life should abandon the law-first perspective and should proceed, paradoxically, with its eye not on law, but on events or practices that seem on the face of things,
removed from law, or at least not dominated by law from the outset.").
105 As Professor Gordon cautioned:
Specialized elites may exercise a disproportionate influence on the manufacture of the forms that go into the constitution of legal relations, but the
forms are manufactured, reproduced, and modified for special purposes by
everyone, at every level, all the time. Critics are not going to get this insight
across if they don't switch their focus [from engaging traditional doctrine].
Gordon, supra note 94, at 123.
106 See Brigham, supra note 98, at 452 (similarly arguing that the decentered view
should not constrain constitutive research).
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contradictory, or even dichotomous. At a minimum, then, the choices
posed are unnecessary ones. Moreover, the choices posed are harmful because eventually they impair our ability to understand more
comprehensively the complex interactions, including the simultaneous, ongoing, and mutual constitution of law and society. Examining
the various antinomies demonstrates both the explanatory power and
transcendent potential of co-constitutive theory.
For example, much scholarship has already revealed both the internalization and the falsity of the public/private dichotomy. In Robert Gordon's words:
A familiar example of the way in which legal categories affect social
perceptions would be the carryover into common speech and perceptions of the legal distinction between Public and Private realms
of action, the Public being the sphere of collective action for the
welfare of all through the medium of government (and thus the
only realm of legitimate coercion), 1and
the Private being the sphere
07
of individual self-regarding action.
Thus the public/private distinction has been internalized "as part of
the natural order of things," 08 and, as such, "sets fairly severe limits
on the ways in which we can imagine the world and how to change
it."'1 9 It is not surprising then to find this distinction embedded in
and enveloping equal protection doctrine. 110 This is true both because the distinction operates as a legal construct, and also because it
is powerfully internalized within cultural consciousness. The distinction's power is grounded in its use in legal doctrine, its internalization
throughout society, and law and society's mutually reinforcing understandings of the distinction.
While a co-constitutive understanding reveals the very real internalization of the public/private distinction throughout law and society, it also uncovers the ephemeral potential of such a conception.
Once we understand the co-constitutive nature of the public/private
distinction, we can de-naturalize the distinction and imagine transcending it. In order to transcend this distinction we must imagine a
different construction of how the public and private spheres relate."'
This requires understanding the falsity of the dichotomy, or acknowledging that, as Kristin Bumiller explicated Emile Durkheim's analysis,
107 Gordon, supra note 94, at 109. I am less certain than Professor Gordon that the
public/private distinction was constructed by law and then imported into society. It could
have been constructed by society and then imported into law. More likely, it was mutually
constituted by law and society simultaneously.
108 Id.
109
Id. at 109-10.
110 See discussion of the antinomy between public and private supra Part I.A.7.
111 See Munger, supra note 2, at 89-90, 112, 125 (encouraging use of the sociological
imagination).
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"all law is private in that it involves individual activity, and all law is
public in that it involves social functions and roles."" 2 Thus, the public/private distinction is not much of a dichotomy at all because the
two spheres are neither mutually exclusive nor contradictory, but
113
rather mutually constitutive.
The other antinomies similarly lack dichotomous characteristics.
Even the first antinomy's dispute over the ultimate goal of equal protection fails to rise to the level of a dichotomy because equal protection conceivably might seek to both promote assimilation and
eliminate subordination. The landmark cases of Brown v. Board of Education" 4 and Loving v. Virginia" 5 imagine and reflect both possibilities. In these decisions, the Court recognized how laws prohibiting
people of different racial backgrounds from intermingling in school
and marriage socially stigmatized racial minorities." 6 The Court
might plausibly have viewed the harm as either subordination itself or
as a barrier to assimilation. For example, the Court in Loving noted
that Virginia's statutes prohibiting interracial marriage rested upon
racial distinctions, thus failing the color-blindness test.'1 7 Yet the statutes prohibited all people of different races from marrying, satisfying
formal equality. The Court, however, recognized that the state's actual purpose was to preserve the integrity of only the white race-a
formal inequality.118 In effect, the Court's own analysis demonstrates
not only the lack of necessity, but perhaps the logical impossibility of
choosing between the antinomies: the goals of assimilation and antisubordination might be understood as mutually constitutive rather
than internally contradictory.
Similarly, a co-constitutive understanding illuminates how the
second antinomy between sameness and difference is a false dichotomy. In his research regarding the education of disabled children,
David Engel has shown the paradox created by the choice between
sameness and difference. 119 On the one hand, the law requires that
112 BuauLLER, supranote 4, at 61 (construing EmILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABoR
IN SociTmr 68 (1933)).
113

For a description of the role of Stewart Macaulay and other law and society scholars

in disrupting and transcending the public/private distinction, see Munger, supra note 98,

at 45-46.
114
115

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
388 U.S. 1 (1967).

116 For an analysis of Brown on similar terms, see BumaLLER, supra note 4, at 67-68.
117 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 ("There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes proscribe
generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races.").
118 See id. ("The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white
persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as
measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.").
119 See David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Children with Disabilities:EducationalRights and
the Construction of Difference, 1991 Dual LJ. 166.
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children with disabilities receive the same right to education as
nondisabled children. 120 On the other hand, a child must first prove
that she is disabled, in effect proving her difference, in order to qualify for the right to the same education. In fact, the accommodating
education is itself deemed "special."' 2 ' Engel concluded that this
rights analysis simultaneously liberates disabled children "from isolated and inadequate educational programs" yet reproduces "the very
distinctions it sets out to obliterate." 22 Engel's analysis thus provides
an example of how sameness and difference play roles in mutually
constituting one another: a recognition of difference creates a right to
sameness, while the very process of obtaining the right reinforces
difference.
By focusing our attention on the ways that law and society mutually construct and constrain one another, a co-constitutive approach
disrupts a formal equal protection analysis. A co-constitutive approach denies the belief that law is autonomous. 123 Instead, it requires
that scholars explore how law is internal to the constitution of social
practices 24 and how social practices are internal to the constitution of
law. Law and society researchers have used co-constitutive insights to
accomplish varied goals, for example: to show how law and society
125
mutually reinforce the hierarchy between "haves" and "have-nots";
to explore how sociolegal identities such as persons, victims, citizens,
and classes are part of "the core of fictions created by the law";'

26

to

reveal how social and legal identities are multiple, complex, and contingent; 127 and to demonstrate the role of law in producing cultural
meaning.128 As the next Part shows, other co-constitutive insights
abound in both doctrine and theory.
See id. at 204.
i& at 204-05.
Id. at 205.
See, e.g., HUNT, supranote 2, at 304-05; Munger, supra note 2, at 121.
See Sarat & Kearns, supra note 92, at 31.
125 See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 95, 95-97 (1974) (describing how social and economic advantages systemically favor the "haves" and disfavor the "have-nots" throughout the legal
system).
126 BuMwLLsR, supra note 4, at 60.
127 See HuNT, supranote 2, at 330 (co-constitutive theory studies "the impact of law on
behavior or on the formation of identities and social consciousness"); Sarat et al., supra
note 3, at 4-6 (collecting and summarizing sources); see also Kathryn Abrams, The Constitution of Women, 48 AL.A L. Rnv. 861, 883-84 (1997) (urging development of "a multi-faceted
theory which clarifies that discrimination against women differs in different contexts and
which affects distinct subgroups of women in varying ways" and suggesting that the
Supreme Court has begun to project "more complex, contingent" depictions of women).
128
See MERRY, supra note 4, at 17-18 (collecting and summarizing sources); Jane S.
Schacter, Skepticism, Culture and the Gay Civil Rights Debate in a Post-Civil-Rights Era, 110
HARv. L. Rav. 684,717-30 (1997) (book review) (exploring how law affects culture and how
culture affects law in terms of the meaning of sexual orientation).
120
121
122
123
124
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I
ExAMPLEs OF CO-CONSTITUTIVE THEORY AT WORK

The first two Parts of this Article provided an overview of equal
protection's antinomic discourse and introduced co-constitutive theory as a new framework for understanding and transcending this discourse. This third Part explores several examples of co-constitutive
theory at work. First, it links several outlier equal protection cases to
their underlying co-constitutive insights and suggests that these cases
imply an emerging co-constitutive third strand in equal protection
doctrine. Second, it identifies several co-constitutive aspects of the
scholarly contributions to this Symposium.
A.

Equal Protection's Co-Constitutive Third Strand

Equal protection doctrine can be succinctly summarized as a two
strand analysis: courts apply heightened scrutiny only to government
actions that either burden a sufficiently suspect class 129 (the first
strand) or infringe on a sufficiently fundamental right'3 0 (the second
strand). In order to situate the following examples of co-constitutive
theory at work, one must unpack this neat doctrinal summary.
Historically, equal protection doctrine focused on two primary
variables, the class of people affected and their affected interest or
right. After it identified these two variables, the Supreme Court faced
two choices. First, it could consider the class and right either in relation to one another or independently of one another. The Court
chose the latter, and generally considers the class and right independently of one another, resulting in its two-strand approach.' 3 ' The
Court then encountered a second choice of how to structure its review. Justices Marshall and Stevens famously urged the Court to adopt
a sliding-scale approach that would allow for flexible but careful consideration of the competing interests.1 3 2 Instead of employing a slid129
The common phrase "suspect class" is, of course, a misnomer. It is not the class,
but the government's targeting of the class, that is suspect. The so-called suspect class
analysis evolved from the Supreme Court's recognition that "prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). More recently, the Supreme Court has shifted its
concern from presumptively suspect targeting of a class, such as that of African Americans,
to government deployment of presumptively irrelevant classifications, such as race. See
supra Part lA.5 (discussing the antimony between classifications or classes).
130 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 39, at 532-33.
131
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long

as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.").
132 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 109-10 (1973) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
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ing scale, the Court gradually developed categorical tiers of scrutiny
used to identify the strength of the individual and the government
interests and to determine the requisite fit between the government's
ends and its means.' 3 3 I suggest that co-constitutive theory offers a
partial critique of the Court's first choice; the Court should have provided a means for consideration of the class and right in relation to
one another. I do not address the Court's second methodological
choice, whether-once inside a strand-it should employ tiers of scrutiny, a sliding scale, or some other method for evaluating the compet134
ing interests and the fit between the government's ends and means.
The following discussion explains how the Court has begun to consider classes and rights in co-constitutive relation to one another.
Within the two-strand analysis of equal protection doctrine, one
of the persistent questions is whether the equal protection mandate
prohibits governmental discrimination against classes not deemed to
be suspect and with regard to rights not deemed to be fundamental.
In its apparent desire to avoid the difficult questions associated with
133 The first step identifies the individual interests. The first-step occurs when a court
assigns the case to its first or second strand by determining whether the affected individual
is a member of a fully suspect or quasi-suspect class (the first strand), and whether the
individual's interest invokes a fully fundamental or quasi-fundamental right (the second
strand). The second step requires a court to determine the strength of the government's
interests. The third step requires a court to evaluate the fit between the government's
means and its ends.
Each strand of equal protection doctrine utilizes three familiar tiers of scrutiny. For
most classes or rights, the Court applies rational review, upholding governmental discrimination if it is rationally related to achieving legitimate governmental purposes. See Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct 631, 645-46 (2000) (applying rational review to laws that
classified based on age). For quasi-suspect classes (such as gender-based classes) or quasifundamental rights, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny, allowing governmental discrimination only if it is substantially related to achieving important governmental objectives. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (requiring that a state "at
least" satisfy intermediate scrutiny to successfully defend its gender discrimination). For
fully suspect classes (such as race-based classes) or fully fundamental rights, the Court applies strict scrutiny, permitting governmental discrimination only if it is narrowly tailored
to further compelling governmental interests. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (requiring that all racial classifications be subjected to strict scrutiny). Conventional wisdom states that courts uphold laws reviewed on a rational basis,
strike down laws reviewed with strict scrutiny, and alternate between upholding and invali-

dating laws reviewed with intermediate scrutiny. See CHEmmRiNsKy, supra note 39, at 527-33.

There have been times when the Court has struck down laws reviewed on a rational basis,
and some scholars have identified a fourth tier of rationality with "bite" to explain these
outlier cases. Gerald Gunther, Foreword:In Search ofEvolvingDoctrineon a ChangingCourt: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 18-22 (1972). Contrary to Gerald
Gunther's famous assertion, the Supreme Court has insisted that strict scrutiny is not "fatal
in fact." Id. at 9; Adarand,515 U.S. at 202.
134 It might be helpful to explain how the co-constitutive approach differs from intermediate scrutiny. While intermediate scrutiny considers separately whether the case involves either a quasi-suspect class or a quasi-fundamental right, the co-constitutive
approach considers the mutually constituting relations of the right and the class. See Nice,

supra note 5, at 1213.
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applying the doctrine's two strands to new factual situations, the
Supreme Court has ignored whether a particular class is suspect or
whether a particular right is fundamental, thus generally refusing to
recognize additional suspect classes or fundamental rights. 135 Yet the
Court has allowed exceptions to this general pattern by occasionally
ignoring the established equal protection doctrine to invalidate government classifications that typically would have survived if the Court
strictly adhered to that doctrine.136 These exceptions suggest an
emerging third strand of equal protection doctrine-one that consid37
ers the class and right in co-constitutive relation to one another.
As I have explored in greater detail elsewhere, 3 8 the Supreme
Court has begun to craft this third doctrinal strand to invalidate government actions that do not burden suspect classes or fundamental
rights. In these outlier cases, the Court has refused to separate the
first two doctrinal strands, which it normally treats as independent.
135
All nonsuspect government actions not burdening any fundamental right receive
the lowest judicial scrutiny, namely rational review, which requires the government to
prove that its means are rationally related to a legitimate interest and typically results in
judicial deference and validation of these allegedly discriminatory government actions. See
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("The general rule
is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by
the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
136
None of the cases involved a class deemed suspect or a right deemed fundamental.
The Supreme Court applied rational review and invalidated Colorado's Amendment 2,
which prohibited legal protection of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people from discrimination,
even though the Court did not declare sexual minorities as a suspect class nor the right to
petition any branch of government for protection from discrimination as a fundamental
right. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Similarly, the Court applied intermediate
scrutiny and invalidated a Texas statute that effectively denied a free public education to
children of undocumented immigrants, even though the Court did not declare immigrant
children as a suspect class nor the right to free public education as a fundamental right.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). Finally, the Court applied strict scrutiny and invalidated a Mississippi rule that denied an appeal to a mother who could not afford the transcript fee required to appeal the termination of her parental rights, even though the Court
did not declare indigent parents as a suspect class nor the right to appeal termination of
parental rights as a fundamental right. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996). Instead,
these cases establish a pattern of invalidating laws when those laws infringe upon rights
particularly important to relatively vulnerable classes.
137 A co-constitutive relation presents only one of many possible ways to understand
relations between two variables. Specifically, a co-constitutive framework is not the only
way for the Court to consider a class and a right in relation to one another. The Court
could, for example, simply aggregate the vulnerability of the class and the importance of
the right in a "stacking" approach. It could decide that the combined weight of the vulnerability of the class and the importance of the right triggers some form of heightened scrutiny, i.e., either intermediate or strict scrutiny. While such a stacking approach lies beyond
the purview of this Article, it merits future exploration. In the meantime, it is sufficient to
note that a stacking approach is different than a co-constitutive approach. In particular, a
stacking approach likely would trigger heightened scrutiny more frequently than the coconstitutive approach will. For an analogous use of stacking in the context of the qualified
immunity doctrine, see Alan K Chen, 7he Ultimate Standard: QuafiedImmunity in the Age of
ConstitutionalBalancing Tests, 81 IowA L. Rxv. 261, 307-13 (1995).
138
See Nice, supra note 5.
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Instead, the Court has considered the class and the right in relation to
one another, effectively applying heightened scrutiny when governmental actions target relatively unprotected classes for the denial of
rights particularly important to those classes.' 3 9 I have suggested that
this third strand recognizes co-constitutive theory's insight that law
and society mutually constitute one another. 14° Specifically, third
strand analysis considers rights and classes in relation to one another.
It understands rights as partially marked, defined, and constituted by
the classes that do or do not hold them, and it also understands those
141
rights as partially marking, defining, and constituting those classes.
The third strand of equal protection doctrine reveals the
Supreme Court's implicit use of co-constitutive insights in its reasoning. For example, the Court relied on co-constitutive understandings
of law and society in three prominent cases: Romer v. Evans,14 2 Plyler v.
Doe,143 and M.L.B. v. S.L.J. 4 4 In each of these cases, the co-constitutive relations between law and society materialized in the connections
between the right involved and the class affected. Each law at issue
sought to deny a right from a class that had been marked by the lack
of that right, thus legally perpetuating one of the specific social characteristics that disadvantaged the class.
In Evans, Colorado's Amendment Two' 45 targeted gay people, a
class marked by discrimination and by exclusion from antidiscrimina139 This third strand differs from the Supreme Court's use of intermediate scrutiny
and strict scrutiny because both intermediate and strict scrutiny separate consideration of
the suspectness of the class from the fundamentality of the right, whereas third strand
analysis considers the class and the right in relation to one another. See id. at 1215.
140 For excellent overviews of law and society's constitutive theory, see EwIcK & SiLBmr,
supra note 4, at 22-23. Ewick and Silbey note how
[b]ecause law is both an embedded and an emergent feature of social life,
it collaborates with other social structures... to infuse meaning and constrain social action....

In sum, we conceive of legality as an emergent structure of social
life that manifests itself in diverse places, including but not limited to formal institutional settings. Legality operates, then, as both an interpretative
framework and a set of resources with which and through which the social
world (including that part known as the law) is constituted.
Id.; see also Sarat & Kearns, supra note 92, at 29 (describing constitutive scholars as believing
"that law permeates social life and that its influence is not adequately grasped when law is
treated as an external, normative missile launched at independent, ongoing activities" and
believing that "we have internalized law's meanings and its presentations of us, so much so
that our own purposes and understandings can no longer be extricated from them").
141
See Nice, supra note 5, at 1222-26; see also BuMILLER, supranote 4, at 71 (describing
how those who enjoy rights do not need them, while those who seek rights are defined as
the class of those who do not enjoy them).
142
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
143 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
144 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
145 See COLO. CoNsT. art. IT, § 30b, held unconstitutionalby Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
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tion protection, 4 6 and denied them the right to receive governmental
protection from discrimination. 14 7 In Plyler, Texas targeted undocumented immigrant children, a class marked by its presumed undereducation, 48 and denied them the right to receive a free public education. 14 9 Finally, in M.L.B., Mississippi targeted an impoverished
mother, one of a class marked by both poverty and allegations of parental unfitness, 150 and denied her the right to a free appeal of ajudicial order that found her to be an unfit parent and terminated her
parental rights. 15 1
Although formal equal protection doctrine would have required
the Court to separate its consideration of whether heightened scrutiny
isjustified either because the right is fundamental or because the class
is suspect, 152 the Court instead considered the right and the class in
relation to one another. For example, Colorado defended Amendment Two by arguing that it simply denied gay people special rights.
The Court in Evans, however, rejected Colorado's special-rights defense by recognizing that "the protections Amendment 2 withholds"
cannot be characterized as special precisely because they are "taken
for granted by most people either because they already have them or
do not need them.'
This reasoning was crucial to the Court's analysis and revealed its understanding of rights as influenced by, and in54
fluencing, the social classes and the context in which they function.1
Similarly, the Court in Plylerrecognized that denying undocumented
immigrant children the right to a free public education would directly

See Schacter, supra note 8, at 286-90.
See Nice, supra note 5, at 1226-29.
For an exploration of one scholar's negotiation around such a presumption, see
Margaret E. Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas, y Gref1as: Un/Masking the Self While Un/Braiding
Latina Stories and Legal Discourse 17 Huv. WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 186-92 (1994).
149
See Nice, supra note 5, at 1232-36.
150 For analyses of the assumption that poor women are bad mothers, see, e.g.,JuurE A.
NICE & LouIsE G. TRUBEK, POVERTY LAW: THEORYAND PRAarICE 31-40, 618-620 (1997); id.at
31-32, 230-231 (Supp. 1999); Martha L.Fineman, Images ofMothers in Poverty Discourses,1991
DUxE LJ. 274; Lucy A. Williams, Race, Rat Bites, and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse
Informs Welfare LegislationDebate, 22 FoRDHsa URa. LJ. 1159 (1995). For an example and a
critique of the assumption at work in case law, see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 322-23
(1971) (justifying home visits to welfare recipients as presumptively and reasonably necessary to monitor health and safety of children), and id at 342 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(questioning the assumption that welfare recipients are more likely than the general population to be bad parents).
151
See Nice, supra note 5, at 1239-42.
152
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) ("[I]f a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so
long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.").
153
Id. at 631.
154
See Nice, supra note 5, at 1229-32.
146
147
148

1424

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1392

impede their ability to improve their subordinated status in society.' 5 5
Finally, in M.L.B., the Court recognized that denying an appeal to an
impoverished mother due to her inability to pay court fees would prohibit a poor parent from resisting the very thing she needed to oppose-the brand of parental unfitness. 15 6 Thus, in each case, the
Court understood how the right and the class influenced the meaning
of one another. This co-constitutive insight justified the Court's
heightened scrutiny, which resulted in the invalidation of discriminatory laws, something its formal equal protection doctrine otherwise
57
would have precluded.
B.

Co-Constitutive Contributions in this Symposium

In this Symposium's collection of articles, other legal scholars employ co-constitutive theory, albeit in largely unmarked ways. For example, both Angela Harris and Linda McClain explore our
conceptions of equality, freedom, and governance, thus contributing
to our understanding of the state and civil society in co-constitutive
relation.' 58 Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati call for legal recognition
of both the identity of work and the work of identity.15 9 Martha Mahoney shows how law continues to perpetuate segregation and uses
critical theory to re-imagine segregation as de-naturalized. 160 Darren
Hutchinson continues to explore the problems of singular essentialism, here decentering white privilege within gay identity.' 61 Because
each of these authors assumes that law and society are mutually constitutive, their work contributes to the co-constitutive enterprise of con1 62
ceptualizing law "in relation to the nonlegal."

155 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982) ("[B]y depriving the children of any
disfavored group of an education, we foreclose the means by which that group might raise
the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority."); Nice, supra note 5, at 1238.
156 See M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 125 (1996); Nice, supra note 5, at 1247-50.
157 See Nice, supra note 5, at 1211.
158 See Angela P. Harris, Foreword:Beyond Equality:Power and the Possibility of Freedom in
the Republic of Choice, 85 Com mu. L Rxv. 1181 (2000); Linda C. McClain, Toward aFormative
Project of SecuringFreedom andEquality, 85 CoRNELL L. REv. 1221 (2000); see also HuNr, supra
note 2, at 305-13 (exploring conceptions of law and governance).
159 See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CoELmu. L. REv. 1259
(2000).
160 See Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Remedy: Under-Ruling Civil Rights in Walker v.
Mesquite, 85 CoRNELL L. REv. 1309 (2000).
161 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights"for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual Identity
and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CoRN-LL L. REv. 1358 (2000).
162 Hur r, supra note 2, at 329 ("Any attempt at a treatment of law that seeks to do
more than undertake a purely internal enquiry that assumes the radical autonomy of law
must adopt some view on how law is to be conceptualized in relation to the nonlegal.").

2000]

EQUAL PROTECTION'S ANTINOMES

1425

CONCLUSION

Co-constitutive theory offers a framework for both understanding
how law and society mutually constitute one another, and also for reimagining those mutual relations. Doing so offers a way to understand, as well as transcend, the mechanisms behind the ten antinomies of equal protection described in the first part of the essay.
Judges and legal scholars have begun to recognize co-constitutive relations. Not surprisingly, as the theory itself might predict, scholars and
courts have not explicitly articulated these mutual relations, leaving
open the possibility of further understanding through marking, articulating, and exploring the theory's insights. Because applying co-constitutive theory to constitutional law is a new enterprise, I leave open
the question whether co-constitutive theory offers a universal approach to understanding law and society. 163 Nevertheless, co-constitutive theory itself constructs by not merely refuting the dichotomy
between law and society and between rights and classes but also by
affirmatively identifying and revealing their mutually constitutive relations. Its promise for equal protection jurisprudence lies in its potential to help us understand its development thus far and to allow us to
imagine beyond its currently antinomic discourse. Future scholarship
undoubtedly will further articulate co-constitutive theory's insights.

163 I do note, however, as Lawrence Friedman has explained, that law itself is not universal. See Friedman, supra note 91, at 767 ("As everybody knows, the law of one country is
not the same as the law of other countries, in an absolutely literal way. Law is the only
social process studied in universities that completely lacks any reasonable claim to

universality.").

